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PROVING MIRACLES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Robert Birmingham*
Baysianism n.... The application of theology to statistics, or vice
versa. I
I. PANDO
A mule, William Faulkner wrote in his often comic final novel, The
Reivers, "will work patiently for you for ten years for the chance to kick
you once."2 Pando v. Fernandez,3 decided in 1984, did not kick until
1995, when it kicked twice. While once visible in the reports,4 the case
does no work. Not for its litigants: Pando was winning but unpaid. Neither
does it produce economies external to them by being a precedent; Pando
in the trial court, the part of the case that alone excites us, lay uncited until
1995. Like a mule, Pando lacks pride of ancestry, hope of posterity. The
source of both conditions is that outside sparse dicta, only a state trial
court decided, or even addressed, its interesting issue.
The question naturally arises, why care about, why praise, Pando
now? I give two reasons. Profundity: the unit of profundity or depth,
defined later,5 is the turtle; Pando is about an anomaly in probability
theory many turtles down. Aesthetics: the unit of beauty is the millihelen,
the amount of beauty necessary and sufficient to launch one ship.6 The
facts of Pando have many small moments of beauty, or millihelens. This
beauty is a comic beauty, like that of late Faulkner. Imagine less a mule
than a zonkey, the result of mating a zebra and a donkey.7 The animal
looks silly, but not bad.
Pando resolves a dispute over a venture capital contract. The contract-
ing parties are the entrepreneur, who supplies technology or talent, and the
capitalist, who contributes money. The kind of contract in Pando is
underreported in its initial stages. Yet its undertaking is hubristic, and
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. The author would like to thank Sharon
Jones for her assistance.
STAN KELLY-BOOTnE, THE COMPUTER CONTRADICTIONARY 24 (2d ed. 1995).
WILLIAM FAULKNER, THE ROVERS 123 (1962).
485 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
Pando v. Hernandez vanishes from the reports in 1989.
See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Stan Kelly-Bootle, Devil's Advocate: The Mother of All Columns, 9 UNIX REv. 17
(1991).
' See Chung-I Wu, Now Blows the East Wind, 380 NATURE 105 (1996).
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acclaim always accompanies its improbable success. The capitalist in
Pando is Fernandez, a welfare mother. Fernandez paid in four dollars.
Pando is the entrepreneur thinking, "I can do that."8 These days entrepre-
neurs often are young, Pando being fourteen when the minds of the parties
met. He purchased four lottery tickets, picking the numbers. Then he
beseeched St. Eleggua-whose identity I withhold for now-that a ticket
he picked win. Pando and Fernandez seek divine intercession to accom-
plish a transfer payment. A scholar of law and economics would discour-
age praying by Pando as investment squandered. Yet the parties do nothing
dishonorable. Pando put their money in play, risked losing it; thus he
differs from a psychic offering to disclose winning numbers to callers on
a 900 line, while not playing the lottery herself.
What consideration does Pando anticipate? Pando could not have
bought lottery tickets in his own name. Fernandez promised equally to
divide any profit. One of the tickets had to win to create the profit, a first
condition precedent. The trial court uncovered or constructed a second
condition precedent which we are about to come to. Fernandez denied
having promised, else we would not have a case. But clearly she promised.
Or minimally the allegation by Pando that she promised raises a disputed
issue of fact that the court ought not resolve on a motion for summary
judgment. One of the tickets won about $2.8 million. After publicly and
effusively complimenting Pando for his connection, Fernandez, having
recalculated her options, declined to divide the profits. Pando sued for
breach of contract.
Now comes the source of the millihelens, the second condition
precedent (besides a ticket winning) to Fernandez having to pay Pando.
The contract looks enforceable. We will see one scholar deny that it is a
contract at all.9 But this result is an outlier and policy-driven. The parties
promised; and, the promises having been exchanged, consideration is
certain. Judge Greenfield, who grants the summary judgment, brushes aside
ankle-biting interpositions by Fernandez of the Statute of Frauds and
illegality. The state pays off over many years; to satisfy the statute,
however, Fernandez need only assign Pando his share, which she can do
immediately. Neither is Greenfield going to deny Pando this share on the
ground that as an infant he should stay away from lotteries.
But for a mistake by his attorney, Pando would have won $1.4
million after a bench trial, and his case would have been unreported.
Superficially the mistake was inartfully drafting an affidavit. Some further
turtles down, unmentioned in law school, it was not realizing that a
' Window on Silicon Valley: The Internet: Opportunity or Mania?, CAL. TECH STOCK LETrR,
May 23, 1996, at 4.
' See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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contract "exists in a superposition of states until an observation or mea-
surement is made":1°
Imagine a cat confined to a box containing a bottle of poisonous gas, which
will break, killing the cat, if and only if a device connected to it registers the
radioactive decay of a radium atom. If the atom, device, and cat together
constitute a quantum system, then it seems that this system will exist in a
superposition of states unless and until an observer tries to determine which
state it is in, by seeing whether or not the cat is dead. But this implies that in
the absence of such an observation the cat is neither determinately dead nor
determinately alive, which seems absurd."
The lesson is that metaphysically the contract is according to the third
umpire:
The first one says, "Some's balls and some's strikes and I calls 'em as they is."
The second says, "Some's balls and some's strikes and I calls 'em as I sees
'em as I see 'em." The third says, "Some's balls and some's strikes but they
ain't nothin 'till I calls 'em."'"
The contract lacked concreteness before Pando's suit. The negotiations, the
contract itself, were oral, in Spanish, and between parties innocent of law.
Like the cat, the contract was nothing, neither alive nor dead, until Pando's
attorney observed it, collapsing the wave function. More humbly it was like
the pitch in the story, neither ball nor strike, until the umpire, here Pando's
attorney, called it.
With this opportunity to shape the litigation before him, Pando
pleaded:
Mrs. Fernandez, knowing that I am religious and a strong believer in St.
Eleggua asked me, after noticing that the Lotto prize was several million
dollars, whether or not I could get my Saint to win the Lottery. I told her that
I did not know, but I would try. She thereupon told me that she would give me
$4.00 to select four different tickets and that if my St. Eleggua made my
selection of the lottery tickets win, she would go equal partners with me on the
prize.'
3
The affidavit admits an otherwise open issue of fact. It makes Fernandez's
duty to pay Pando depend, not on his beseeching St. Eleggua and a ticket
" EJ. Lowe, Cat, Schrtidnger's, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 125 (Ted
Honderich ed., 1995) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION].
Id.
2 George Gurley, In My Book: Why Play Ball When You Can Think About It?, KAN. CrrY STAR,
Sept. 18, 1994, at Kll.
'3 485 N.Y.S.2d 162, 167 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1984) (quoting affidavit of Christopher Pando).
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he picked winning, but on St. Eleggua causing it to win. No court or jury
would have implied this condition had the plaintiff not conceded it-despite
Greenfield's wallowing in the consequent opportunity, rare in a state trial
court, to do metaphysics. With the concession, Pando had to prove a
miracle to prevail."' Therein hangs a constitutionally instructive story,
which this Essay relates.
H. ANTECEDENTS
A mule, as Faulkner put it, is "free of the obligations of ancestry."' 5
Ancestry is where you find it--often social construct instead of biological
fact. I present one example: at German universities, talent descended from
father to son-in-law, young academics marrying their professors' daughters,
and thus improving their prospect of appointments to professorships. 6 In
this open spirit I mention legal, mathematical, and philosophical antecedents
of the case that Judge Greenfield overlooked.
A. Estate of Kidd 7
Like Pando, Kidd plays off a tension between mainstream and idiosyn-
cratic belief. On November 9, 1949, James Kidd, a miner and prospector
whose life was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short in Arizona, disap-
peared in the desert. By 1964 he was presumed dead, his estate assessed at
$174,065.69, and a holographic will recovered. The will directed that the
assets of the estate "go in a research or some scientific proof of a soul of
the human body which leaves at death I think in time their can be a
Photograph of soul leaving the human at death."'8
A billion dollars is not what it used to be and neither is $174,065.69.
The estate attracted 103 or so claimants. They fell broadly into four classes,
two of which dropped out early. By admitting the will to probate, Judge
Meyers disappointed the first class, the putative heirs, who likewise lost an
interlocutory appeal, having put "Descartes before the horse."'9 Meyers
also decided the will created a charitable trust, disqualifying a second class
of claimants, representatively including Clausser, who asserted she had wit-
nessed her soul leave her body in Stuttgart in 1937. Claimants of this class,
against the plain meaning of its language, which concededly is not every-
Id. at 167-68.
IS FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 123.
16 MARK KAC, ENIGMAS OF CHANCE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 28 (1985).
,7 479 P.2d 697 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 842 (1971).
IS Id. at 699.
,9 JoHN G. FuuEL, THE GREAT SouL TRIAL 35 (1969).
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thing or Pando would be easier, read the will to bequeath the money
outright as a retrospective reward for proving the soul exists. Or they utterly
mistook the character of the proceeding, as did the author of a letter that
went, "I wrote you yesterday seeking information as to where I could send
my answer to the Kidd Mystery Contest, and I FORGOT to put a stamp on
the return envelope."'
Meyers held protracted hearings to choose among surviving applicants.
These were orthodox scientific claimants, notably the Barrow Neurological
Institute, which would use the funds to investigate the brain; and parapsy-
chological organizations like the American Society for Psychical Research,
which would sponsor seances. Any oxymoron aside, the latter claimants are
respectable parapsychological organizations. Meyers chose Barrow, but was
reversed by the Supreme Court of Arizona sitting en banc. The opinion of
that court, by Justice Struckmeyer, held that a probate court has no business
imposing its preference as to how a testator disposes of her estate. The
court then disqualified Barrow because its researchers "do not consider it
possible to discover proof of a soul which leaves at death and, consequent-
ly, do not propose to attempt scientific research to that end.
' 2
'
On remand Meyers was directed to choose from among the parapsy-
chological organizations. Presumably he did so.22
B. Cosmology
The tools required to analyze Pando are, speaking increasingly
specifically, the mathematical theory of probability, its component Bayes'
theorem, the theorem's use of prior probabilities, and the determination of
priors through the principle of indifference. I explain Bayes' theorem
20 Id. at 47.
21 479 P.2d at 704.
2 Belatedly, the benchmark scientific journal Nature proposed a technique to study the departing
soul without recourse to a medium:
The subject must be sealed in an enclosed cell equipped with an air regenerator, supported
on sensitive piezoelectric transducers and fitted with the finest inertial-navigation accelerome-
ters. He must be fitted with sensors for heart-beat, breathing, peristalsis and other bodily
movements. A central computer will receive all the transducer and sensor signals, and will
refine a model of the whole system and generate its equation of motion....
When the subject dies, this equation will cease to fit. The computer will carry on
processing the transducer data, and will ultimately optimize a new equation of motion, with
different mechanical constants. Propagating this backwards to the moment of death will then
reveal the discontinuities caused by the loss of the soul. The change of mass will reveal its
weight; the change of centre of gravity will reveal the site it had vacated; the alteration of
inertial moments will reveal its mass distribution. The form of the recoil at the instant of
death will reveal the velocity, direction and spin of the departing soul, and the time it had
taken to leave the body.
David Jones, Soular Mass, 366 NATURE 412, 412 (1993). The technique comes too late to help Barrow.
.19961
GEO. MASON L. REV.
below;' priors and the principle of indifference are so unintuitive that I
introduce them up front.
Shadows of the Mind24 by Roger Penrose starts with a vignette of
Jessica and her father entering a cave that has a boulder lodged above its
entrance. So now they are inside the cave. Jessica worries that the boulder
will fall forthwith, blocking their exit. Her father reassures her. The
question becomes, what, if anything, the length of time the boulder has
been there has to do with when it will fall. Jessica and her father express
these conflicting views, the father's implicitly endorsed by the author:
Jessica: Surely, if it's going to fall down sometime, then the longer it's
been there, the more likely it's going to fall down now?
Father: Actually, you could even say that the longer that it's been there,
the less likely that it's going to fall down when we're here.'
Penrose is a smart cosmologist,' which is like being a big elephant,
because even a dumb cosmologist is smarter than almost anyone else.27 So
we must see why her father rather than Jessica is right that the boulder
probably will not fall soon.
Penrose probably borrowed the calculation from a fellow cosmologist,
Gott." With no evidence beyond that from the Leakeys,29 Gott answers
the question, How long will our species survive? He claims a 0.95 proba-
bility that we will become extinct between 5,100 and 7,800,000 years
hence. Here is how Gott does it. He-notes we have existed about 200,000
years. He posits that this interval is as likely a proportion of our total
existence as any other proportion, and then omits the 2.5% of proportions
at either extreme. ° This is calculation ex nihilo.
2 See infra Part V.
24 ROGER PENROSE, SHADOws OF THE MIND: A SEARCH FOR THE MISSING SCIENCE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS (1994).
Id. at 4.
26 ALAN LIGHTMAN & ROBERTA BREWER, ORIGINS: THE LIvEs AND WORLDS OF MODERN
COSMOLOGISTS 415 (1990).
2 Adolf Grfinbaum, The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology, 56 PHIL. SI. 373,
383 (1989).
28 J. Richard Gott 1H, Implications of the Copernican Principle for Our Future Prospects, 363
NATURE 315 (1993).
The name, "God" in German, suggests we are being put on; yet Gott exists, "a boyishly pudgy-
faced Kentuckian who never lost his native accent," in which he says "after all, if you could really go
into the past and kill your grandma before you were bom, physics will have to find some way to deal
with that." MICHAEL D. LEMONICK, THE LIGHT AT THE EDGE OF THE UNIVERSE: LEADING COSMOLO-
GISTS ON THE BRINK OF A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 228, 304 (1993).
'9 See VIRGINIA MORELL, ANCESTRAL PASSIONS: THE LEAKEY FAMILY AND THE QUEST FOR
HUMANKIND'S BEGINNINGS (1995).
'o So the 5100 years corresponds to the 200,000 years being .957 of our species' existence
(205,100 years). And the 7,800,000 years corresponds to the 200,000 years being 0.025 of our species'
[Vol. 5:1
PROVING MIRACLES
To understand what drives the dubious calculations of Penrose and
Gott, start from the turtles in a cosmological story I quote from Stephen
Hawking:3
A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public
lecture on astronomy. He described how the earth orbits around the sun and
how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called
our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room
got up and said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat
plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior
smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever,
young man, very clever," said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way
down.,
32
Probabilities resemble these turtles in that one probability stands on the
back of another. Thus, for instance, to get the posterior probability, given
some evidence that the defendant did it, you must start with a prior proba-
bility, the probability without the evidence, that she did it. What cuts off the
regress is that at some stage you arbitrarily choose a first prior. Usually you
use the principle of indifference,33 which directs that if you lack informa-
tion, you distribute the prior probabilities evenly over the possible out-
comes. So if there are two possibilities, the prior for each is 0.5. But it
might just as well be anything else. This distribution is itself arbitrary, as is
the identification of what are the possible outcomes. The conclusions of
Penrose and Gott look arbitrary because they exploit this principle, "the
most notorious principle in the whole history of probability theory."34 In
Pando as elsewhere, there is no getting around priors.
C. Hume
The problem in Pando is that the plaintiff had to prove a miracle. So
a student of the case must ask at once what a miracle is, and ponder how
to prove it. The secondary source at which to start, unavailable to Judge
Greenfield, is The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, which states:
MIRACLES. Usually defined as violations of a law of nature by a supernatural
being. Questions have been raised about how to articulate a notion of law of
nature which is not exceptionless by definition .... Any argument that a
existence (8,000,000 years). The interval of 5100 to 7,800,000 years was the 200,000 years being 0.025
to 0.975 of our species' existence. That is 95 percent of all proportions.
J' It has at least 18 retellings in the ALLREV database of the LAWREV library of LEXIS.
STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988).
JOHN M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILrrY 42, 62 (1921).
4 MICHAEL W. OAKs, STATISTICAL INFERENCE 100 (1986) (attributed to Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.).
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miraculous event has occurred faces the tough challenge of showing both that
the event in question did occur and that it was miraculous. 5
The logical difficulty thereby exposed is straight out of the eighteenth-
century essay Of Miracles by David Hume, which the entry in the Compan-
ion inevitably cites and quotes. The legal interest of Hume is transparent.
He had studied law but because there was too much of it substituted
philosophy. He claimed, "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and
as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any
argument from experience can possibly be imagined."' To this proof a
proponent of the miraculous juxtaposes only the evidence of her senses, if
she believes herself personally to have witnessed a miracle; or, more
frequently, testimonial evidence. It is the common experience of mankind
that intermittently the senses fail. And, as Hume remarks, "no testimony is
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that
its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors
to establish.""' Because witnesses often are credulous or lie, this cannot be
the case.
Hence a belief in a miracle is an act of faith, not reason. Hume
concludes:
So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only
was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by
any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us
of its veracity: And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of
a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of
understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is contrary to
custom and experience."'
m. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Judge Greenfield grants summary judgment for Fernandez. He asks,
"How can we really know what happened?"39 He answers we cannot.
Compare: "Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?"' There are a couple of
'" Noa Latham, Miracles, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 10, at 581.
6 DAVID HuME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 114 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 3d ed. 1975).
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 131.




kinds of impossibility Greenfield is not talking about. Not, or not precisely,
that impossibility which Hume identified; Greenfield's inquiry does not get
that far. Nor is it a constitutional impossibility, generated for instance, by
the Establishment Clause forbidding a court to investigate miracles. Lemon
entanglement' does not come up. Greenfield's inquiry is more into the
impossibility of not being able to look-what once prevented us from
knowing that the other side of the moon is not made of green cheese.
This result is unsatisfying because Greenfield grants that the parties
bargained as Pando said, yet denies his claim. It is the job of a court to
reach and explain an intuitively just result. Instead Greenfield scores a
metaphysical point at Pando's expense. He could have reserved the con-
struction of the contract as an issue of fact to be decided at trial. Or, he
could have decided that the miracle occurred. As I argue below, the Estab-
lishment Clause compels this latter result.
Greenfield explains:
[Jiudges and jurors must decide on what they have seen and heard, not on what
faith leads them to believe. Beliefs founded on faith cannot readily be tested on
motions directed to the sufficiency of the evidence, or on appellate review....
The distinction must always be made between evidence based on knowl-
edge and conclusions based on belief.'
But calculating a probability is always an act of faith because it requires a
prior.
Reproachable as unjust, Pando has contemporary theological implica-
tions. Theology has tried to prove, among other things, that God exists.43
Today some theologians, for instance the Calvinist Plantinga, argue that the
existence of God, like the world not having been created five minutes ago,
is not the kind of thing one proves." Thinking this way, neither is St.
Eleggua working a miracle the kind of thing one proves.
IV. GREENFIELD REDEEMED
Faulkner in his small soliloquy on mules points out they are "free...
of the responsibilities of posterity." Pando (at the trial level) had been
sterile also, in the legal sense of uncited, until 1995. In that year Greenfield,
" See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
41 485 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
, Thus, the ontological proof and natural theology.
R.G. Swinbume, Religion, Problems of the Philosophy of, in OXFORD COMPANION, supra note
10, at 763-64. See generally FArh AND RATIONALrry (Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds.,
1983).
' FAULKNER, supra note 2, at 123.
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hoisting himself by his bootstraps, cited Pando himself. Professors do that
sometimes too. The citing case is Williams v. Bright.' Belatedly, in
Williams, Greenfield gets right what he got wrong in Pando. Paradoxically,
the authority on which he draws to get it right is Pando.
The defendant in Williams negligently injured Robbins, a Jehovah's
witness. Robbins declined to mitigate damages by an operation, safe and
hugely beneficial, that required a blood transfusion. Greenfield charged the
'jury:
Now, in making your determination as to whether she has acted reasonably to
mitigate the damage, I will instruct you that under no circumstances are you to
consider the validity or reasonableness of her religious beliefs....
What is reasonable for adherent[s] of one religion may appear totally un-
reasonable to somebody who has different beliefs, but you may not pass on the
validity of anyone else's beliefs. That is out of bounds for you.
You have to accept as a given that the dictates of her religion forbid
blood transfusions.
And so you have to determine in assessing the question of damages,
damages past and damages future, whether she, Mrs. Robbins, acted reasonably
as a Jehovah's witness in refusing surgery which would involve blood transfu-
sions.
Was it reasonable for her, not what you would do - or your friends or
family - was it reasonable for her, given her beliefs, without questioning the
validity or propriety of her beliefs.'
The jury returned a verdict that awarded the plaintiff damages of
nearly $10 million. The defendant, who had objected to the charge, moved
to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Greenfield denied the motion on
the ground that to instruct otherwise would violate the Establishment or the
Free Exercise Clause. He added, "In our courts, 'theology is to be protected
against the law, just as the law is to be protected from theology.' Pando v.
Fernandez .. .,4.
Unlike Pando, which does not much depend on case law, Greenfield
filling the lacunae in authority by quoting St. Augustine to no purpose,
Williams marshals legal authority lavishly. Of course, by 1995, there was
more of it, i.e., Pando. Greenfield, in Williams, discusses Supreme Court
cases49 that highlight the narrow window between the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses. While the discussion is okay, it tells us more than
we want to know-as if the weatherperson on channel three were to deduce,
starting from the Big Bang, that it will be windy today."0 Greenfield
632 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
I Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 764.
Starting with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
o See infra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of how chaos theory shows that this
[Vol. 5:1
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examines as well New York precedential decisions that find a plaintiff has
no duty to mitigate damages by engaging in behavior against her religious
conviction. Greenfield's investigation of these cases, while it gets him
where he wants to go, is curiously incomplete. It omits the preeminent
academic analysis of such mitigation, by Dean, now Judge, Calabresi.
Calabresi's analysis commences from a New York case, Friedman v.
State,5 also uncited by Greenfield.52 Calabresi calls Friedman "my Jewish
case."53 Friedman and Katz, a sixteen-year-old woman and a nineteen-year-
old man, on a summer day took a chair lift up a mountain, had a picnic,
and started down on the lift. New York State, proprietor of the lift, shut off
the power, leaving them suspended. Friedman believed it religiously awful
to spend the night with a man where others lacked access. It was getting
dark, so she jumped. The Friedman court, as a matter of law, denied she
was contributorily negligent. Calabresi enjoyed teaching the case:
And as the sun sank slowly in the Catskills, Ms. Friedman jumped from the ski
lift. Perhaps, more accurately, one should say she dove, because the case
reports her most significant injuries were facial lacerations. I must interject that
I have never understood why Jack Katz did not jump, or, for that matter, why
she did not push him.54
I
V. BAYES' THEOREM
As I said, the problem in Pando implicates Bayes' theorem. In mathe-
matical terms, Bayes' theorem 5 is:
P(gle) = P(e/g)
P(e)
A probability is a real number between 0 and 1. What Bayes' theorem does
is let evidence change a probability. The probability before the change is
the prior probability. The probability -after the change is the posterior
probability. The posterior probability is the probability conditional on the
evidence.
To illustrate, I present some examples, about proving witchcraft,
prediction is impossible.
282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967), modified, 297 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
52 I speculate that Friedman eluded his research because it nominally involves contributory
negligence not mitigation, and because the New York Court of Claims decided it, making it outside the
main line of precedent.
11 GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFs, ATrrrUDEs, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES
ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 51 (1985).
4 Id.
"' Read P(g/e) as "the probability of guilt given the evidence," P(e/g) as "the probability of the
evidence given guilt," P(e) as "the probability of the evidence," and P(g) as "the probability of guilt."
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consonant with our theological theme. An inquisitor requires a slight
antecedent indication of guilt before torturing an accused. One such
indication is that, on being accused, a suspect appears frightened."
Hence the inquisitor calculates the posterior probability, P(g/e), the
probability the accused is a witch given the evidence that she looks fright-
ened. P(e) is the probability she looks frightened. P(e/g) is the probability
she looks frightened given she is a witch. The prior probability, P(g), is the
probability of her being a witch that the inquisitor starts with, before he
takes into account the evidence. Applying the principle of indifference, as
explained, 7 the inquisitor sets the prior probability at 0.5: she is as likely
a witch as not.
Example 1: Every accused looks scared. Thus, the probability the
accused looks frightened, whether or not she is a witch, is 1.0,58 and the
probability the accused looks frightened if she is a witch is also 1.0."9 We
then calculate the posterior probability, i.e., the probability the accused is a
witch because she looks frightened, as 0.5, as shown below. The evidence
teaches nothing:
P,(g/e) = 0.5 = 0.51
Example 2: All witches, and only witches, look scared. Thus, the
probability the accused looks frightened if she is a witch is 1.0-all witches
look frightened.' Remember that in all of these examples, the prior proba-
bility assumed by the inquisitor that the accused is a witch, without taking
into account any evidence, is set at 0.5.61 Thus, on the basis of this as-
sumed prior, the probability the accused looks frightened whether or not she
is a witch is also 0.5.62 The posterior probability, the probability the
accused is a witch if she looks frightened, is 1.0, as calculated below. The
evidence conclusively establishes guilt:
P2(g/e) = 1 0.5 = 10.5
Example 3: Witches look scared 0.8 of the time; others look scared
only 0.4 of the time. Thus, the probability an accused looks scared if she is
16 HENRI BOGuEr, AN EXAMEN OF WrrCHES (1929); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 3 (1991).





61 P(g) = 0.5.
' The probability an accused will look frightened is the sum of two products: the probability a
witch looks scared, times the prior probability that the accused is a witch; and the probability an
accused who is not a witch looks scared, times the prior probability the accused is not a witch:
P(e) - P(elg)P(g) + P(el-g)P(-g) - 1(0.5) + 0(0.5) - 0.5.
Note that P(-g) - I - P(g) is the prior probability the accused is not a witch.
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a witch is 0.8, and the probability an accused looks scared if she is not a
witch is 0.4.63 Based on these probabilities and the prior probability of 0.5,
the probability any accused will look frightened is 0.6.' The posterior
probability, as calculated below, is 0.67. The evidence substantially in-
creases the probability the accused is guilty:
P3(g/e) = 0.8 0.5 = 0.670.6
VI. PANDO'S PRIOR
The payoff to Fernandez approached $3 million; the lottery sold about
four million tickets. That is close enough for our purposes. Recall that
Pando chose four tickets. The probability that a ticket Pando chooses wins,
given that the Saint does not intervene, is one in a million.' The probabili-
ty that a ticket Pando chooses wins, given that the Saint intervenes, is
1.0.6 If the Saint makes the ticket win, it wins. Recall from example 2 of
the illustrations above that the probability that a ticket Pando chooses wins
is the probability the Saint makes the ticket win, weighted by the probabili-
ty the Saint makes it win, plus the probability the Saint fails to make the
ticket win, weighted by the probability the Saint fails to make it win.67 We
rewrite Bayes' theorem:
P(i/w) = P(wi) P)
P(w/i)P() + P(w/~i)P(-i)
P() P(i)
P(i) + 0.000001(1 -P(i)) 0.999999P(i) + .000001
In the illustrations of Part V, the inquisitor applies the principle of
indifference to identify the prior, then uses the prior to calculate the
posterior. Greenfield decided Pando could not prove the miracle as a matter
of law. Proof in a civil case, which Pando is, requires a preponderance of
63 P(elg) - 0.8 and P(el-g) - 0.4.
Again, this probability, the probability an accused will look frightened, is the sum of two
products. See supra note 62. If 50 percent of a population of 100 women are witches (i.e., 50 women
are witches), and 80 percent of those witches look frightened when accused, then 40 women, who also
happen to be witches, will look frightened. The other 50 women are not witches, but 40 percent of
them will look frightened when accused. Thus, 20 women, who are not witches, will also look
frightened. The total number of women who will look frightened is 60:
P(e) - 0.8(0.5) + 0.4(0.5) - 0.6.
The probability of winning given the Saint does not intervene, P(w-i) = 0.000001.
6 P(wl-) 
_ 1.0.
6 ptw) _ P(w/Op(i) + p(wI-i)p(O.
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the evidence, which translates into a probability greater than 0.5. Therefore,
Greenfield's summary judgment is equivalent to holding that the posterior
in Pando, the probability St. Eleggua made Pando's ticket win, on the evi-
dence it did win, does not exceed 0.5. Now, we can reverse engineer: work
back from the known posterior to calculate the minimum prior that gives





This is a remarkable result. Only if the prior probability the Saint
makes the ticket win-the probability, assessed before considering the
evidence, which is that the ticket did win-does not exceed one in a
million, can Greenfield, mathematically, decide as he did. Of course, absent
legal compulsion, which is coming, Greenfield can pick whatever prior
probability he wants.' But 0.000001 is a long way from indifference. And
Greenfield lacks any experience, of saints intervening or not in lotteries
when prayed to, on which to base the prior probability. This result depends
on Bayes' theorem. Bayes' theorem is a definition of 'conditional
probability.' Or it is a postulate on a par with 'A probability cannot be
negative' or 'The probability of a tautology is 169 That is, Bayes' theo-
rem is entrenched, either as a definition or a postulate.
VII. EKELAND
As merely a lay matter, the coming constitutional claim aside, the
rough treatment Greenfield metes out to the religious undertaking of Pando
and Fernandez is insensitive, disrespectful. For a paradigm of sensibility,
consult a recent small book by Ivar Ekeland, The Broken Dice."0 The book
builds mainly upon the beautiful Icelandic sagas. But Ekeland peripherally
discusses the story from Genesis of Joseph interpreting Pharaoh's dream.
This discussion is representative and coincidentally addresses the issue of
probabilities in Pando.
" See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
69 COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN APPROACH 21 (2d
ed. 1993).
SIVAR EKELAND, THE BROKEN DIcE AND OTHER MATHEMATICAL TALES OF CHANCE (1993).
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Recall the story.7 Joseph is in prison, having been sold by his broth-
ers into Egypt, and eventually cast into prison. He interprets dreams for
other prisoners, some of whom are released unexecuted. They forget him,
however, until Pharaoh has a dream nobody else can figure out. Pharaoh
summons Joseph from prison to interpret his dream: that seven fat cows
come out of the Nile, followed by seven thin cows that consume them; and
that seven good ears of grain grow up, then seven blasted ears that eat
them. God like other good communicators builds in redundancy. The annual
floods of the Nile determine the Egyptian harvests, or did before the Aswan
High Dam.72 Joseph interpreted that seven prosperous years would be suc-
ceeded by seven years of famine, and advised Pharaoh to build granaries to
store the surplus during the good years to distribute during the bad years.
Pharaoh appointed Joseph to manage the project, the harvests were as pre-
dicted, and Pharaoh profited from selling the stores.
The fluctuations in the flow of the Nile have always been capri-
cious.73 Also, Ekeland recognizes that nature alone discloses nothing about
the weather a year ahead, remarking, "On the scale of one year, meteorolo-
gy has no memory. The person who knows that it has rained today and the
person who doesn't have an equal chance of predicting the weather a year
from now."'74 That meteorology lacks memory is a consequence of the
butterfly effect. 5 Hence Ekeland puzzles over the pattern of fourteen
consecutive harvests correctly predicted by Joseph from Pharaoh's dream as
evidence of divine intervention:
There may be climatic cycles, or manifestations of divine anger, but in the
absence of convincing indicators it is reasonable to assume that the weather
next year is independent of the weather this year. The consequence is simple.
If we consider, as we did above, that the years of drought have a frequency of
one in seven, the probability that there will be two consecutive droughts is only
one in forty-nine, and the probability that there will be seven in a row is one
in 823,543. This event is so improbable that its occurrence would be a convinc-
ing indicator of supernatural intervention, or of a mistake in the model. 6
The one in a million of Pando, having the same order of magnitude as
Genesis 41:17-36.
72 See ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: A JOURNEY AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 91-100 (1966).
" See, e.g., FELIPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO, MILLENNIUM: A HISTORY OF THE LAST THOUSAND
YEARs 102-03 (1995).
14 EKELAND, supra note 70, at 155.
" See, e.g., PETER COvENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXTY: THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER IN A CHAOTIC WORLD 170 (1995). Chaos theory shows that, initial conditions not being
knowable with infinite precision, a small variation in them can produce a large change later-often not
much later.
'6 EKELAND, supra note 70, at 154.
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Ekeland's I in 823,543, should bear equal witness to "supernatural interven-
tion."
The context of Pando compounds Greenfield's mistake. A lottery is
literally (etytnologically) casting lots. Ekeland observes that, from a
parochial Christian perspective-which the common law historically presup-
poses-casting lots does not resort to a random process, but invites divine
intercession.' Finally, I mention from literary sources two instances of an
improbable condition or event inducing attribution of a supernatural cause.
In Roger's Version, by Updike, a graduate student offers to prove that God
exists from cosmological coincidences to the fourth decimal place that
supply the conditions necessary for life.7s The underlying idea is that the
universe could not be so finely tuned unless someone, God, had tuned it.
The proof is like that of natural theology, arguing from the analogy of the
existence of a watch proving a watchmaker. How could a watch have come
about by chance? A character in Rosenkranz and Guildenstern Are Dead, a
Stoppard play, includes among candidate explanations of an unbroken
sequence of tossed coins coming up heads, "Three: divine intervention, that
is to say, a good turn from above concerning him, cf. children of Israel, or
retribution from above concerning me, cf. Lot's wife."'79 Again, how could
a coin keep coming up heads unless the equivalent of St. Eleggua was
interceding to make it do so? The improbabilities in these cases, resolvable
by attributing action by God, come from using the principle of indifference
" "The lot is cast into the lap, but the decision is wholly from the Lord"
(Prov. 16:33). Matthais is chosen by lot to complete the twelve apostles
(Acts 1:26), as is Zachary to enter into a sanctuary (Luke 1:9). It is by lot,
Ourim or Toummim, that the almighty designates the guilty, Jonathan (1
Sam. 14:37-43), Jonah (Jon. 1:1-10), Achan (Josh. 7:10-23), and by which
Saul is designated king of Israel (1 Sam. 10:20-24). Following the ex-
pression of Augustine (Enarrationes in Psalmos [Ps 30:16, enarr. 2, serm.
2]), "Sors non est aliquid mali, sed res, in humana dubitatione, divinam
indicans voluntatem." "Lots are not bad in and of themselves, but indicate
the divine will when man is in doubL"
Id. at 9 & n.3.
78 About fifty years ago a physicist called Paul Dirac asked himself why the
number ten to the fortieth power keeps occurring. The square of this
number, ten to the eightieth power, is the mass of the visible universe,
measured in terms of the mass of the proton. The number itself, ten to the
fortieth, is the present age of the universe, expressed in units of time it
takes light to travel across a proton. And, get this, the constant that mea-
sures the strength of gravity in terms of the electrical force between two
protons is ten to the fortieth times weaker! Also, ten to the fortieth to the
one-fourth, or ten to the tenth, just about equals the number of stars in a
galaxy, the number of galaxies in the universe, and the inverse of the weak-
fine structure constant!
JOHN UPDIKE, ROGER'S VERSION 23-24 (1986); GEORGE JOHNSON, A FIRE IN THE MIND: SCIENCE,
FArrH, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 308-16 (1996).
'9 TOM STOPPARD, ROSENKRANZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD 11 (1967).
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to distribute priors over lots of possible outcomes. Seven good years
followed by seven bad years is improbable if all sequences of good and bad
years are equally probable. So is a set of cosmological values with 10'
improbable, unless the values are constrained. Using the principle of indif-
ference, the prior probability of a sequence of n heads is I/n, which is very
low for large n.
VIII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR
Put against this background, the constitutional argument is straightfor-
ward. Pando must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Saint
intervened. That is, Pando must establish a posterior probability greater than
0.5 that she did so. His evidence is that a lottery ticket he chose for
Fernandez won. The posterior probability that the Saint intervened depends
on three quantities. Two of these are parameters set by the context: the
probability of Pando's ticket winning if St. Eleggua makes the ticket win;
and the probability of Pando's ticket winning if she does not. Their values
are 1.0 and 0.000001, respectively.' The third quantity is the prior proba-
bility.
Figure 1 portrays, the posterior probability of intervention given the
evidence that Pando's ticket won, P(i/w), along the vertical axis as a
function of the prior probability of intervention, P(i), plotted along the
horizontal axis, increasing to the right; and of the number of tickets issued
in the lottery, t, plotted increasing to the back. To avoid having to divide
through by four, Figure 1 further contemplates that Pando purchases a sin-
gle ticket. Not to lose fine structure, it plots t from 1 to 10 instead of from
1 to 1,000,000. The adjustment of scale quantifies the mistake by
Greenfield as five orders of magnitude.
Look first at only the front surface in Figure 1. Here the lottery has
exactly one ticket. Thus Pando wins if he buys the ticket. We learn nothing
from his winning beyond that he bought the ticket, and that the posterior
probability equals the prior probability, both being the probability that he
buys the ticket. As more tickets are issued, so that one moves toward the
back of the box, the posterior increases ever more sharply as the prior
grows from 0.0. In court, Pando, his burden of proof being by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, to win must prove a probability that exceeds 0.5.
With ten tickets, a prior of 0.1 does that. There were the equivalent of one
million tickets*, yet Pando lost, so the court used approximately 0.0.
We come then to what prior, if any, the Constitution requires. Here, as
P(wli) - 1.0, and P(w/-i) - 0.000001.
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Figure 1
elsewhere, the Constitution is succinct to the point of opacity. It directs
only, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.""a  The test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman,82 recited and applied routinely since the Court announced it in
1971, asserts: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion... ; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion." 3 This expansion of the Estab-
lishment Clause is not itself transparent, so that "Our cases.., have made
such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious
government officials can only guess what ... will be held unconstitution-
al." 4 This assessment is of only the first part of the tri-partite test of
Lemon, but the confusion is cumulative.
I will appraise Pando using the Lemon test, and that of An Economic
Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom by McConnell and Judge
Posner 5-the most prominent of the infrequent readings of the religion
clauses having a quantitative cast. Starting from a proposition everyone
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
11 Id. at 612-13.
' Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1989).
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endorses, the authors observe that the First Amendment is "concerned to
keep government's hands off religion in some sense."'  McConnell and
Posner articulate the sense thus:
This policy, which we shall call "neutrality," protects the values embodied in
the religion clauses two ways. First, it guards against government abuse: by
requiring the government to-act neutrally, we make it less likely that legislators
and government officials will use their power, perhaps inadvertently, to
promote or retard religion. Government cannot single out or exclude disfavored
beliefs, or shower favors on favored beliefs, without extending similar
treatment to others. Second, neutrality reduces (and in theory eliminates) the
impact that governmental action has upon individual choice with respect to reli-
gion. If government treats competing activities that are secular the same way
it treats religious activities, it will create neither incentives nor disincentives to
engage in religious activities."
To see crudely and intuitively that Pando is not a marginal case of
nonneutrality, and that it violates the second part in Lemon, imagine the
least marginal case-probably Da Costa v. De Pas.8" There the court disal-
lowed as not charitable a bequest to establish an assembly to read Jewish
law; and the king through his prerogative power, our cy pres, substituted the
purpose of teaching Christianity to children. The difficulty in Da Costa was
the illegality of the bequest. Equivalently Pando and Fernandez by their
shared religious belief made in effect an illegal contract. But what does it
mean to contract illegally? Typically the sole effect of a finding of illegality
is unenforceability,89 as in Pando:
Courts are also fond of condemning the unenforceable agreement as "illegal."
This is misleading insofar as it suggests that some penalty is necessarily
imposed on one of the parties, apart from the court's refusal to enforce the
agreement. In some cases, the conduct that renders the agreement unenforce-
able is also a crime, but it is not necessarily or even usually so.'
The freedom to contract is basic, withheld only from infants, incompetents,
animals, and, historically, women.
Evaluation in terms of priors allows a more subtle and determinate
analysis. First recall that one's choice of a prior is arbitrary.9' Far enough
Id. at 5.
Id. at 11.
27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754).
An exceptional case of collateral consequences from the illegality of a contract is The
Highwayman's Case, 9 LAW Q. REv. 197, 198-99 (1893), in which the court directed that the attorney,
seeking an accounting of the proceeds by a robber against his partner, be hanged.
0 E. Au.AN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrs § 5.1 (2d ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
9' See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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down the stack of turtles there is no empirical or theoretical reason to
choose one prior instead of another. The principle of indifference, which
assigns equal probabilities to a set of possible outcomes, ordinarily exercis-
es, rather than avoids, this arbitrariness. Intuitively, a value of 0.000001 for
the prior probability that the Saint made the ticket win, the largest value
Greenfield could have assigned while deciding Pando as he did, is not
neutral, or in the language of Lemon, inhibits religion. Indeed the principle
of indifference, not good for much else, .supplies a more algorithmic test of
constitutionality than that supplied by McConnell and Posner, who are
trying to be concrete. That it does so presupposes what often is absent-a
salient set of possible outcomes. Yet such a set is present in Pando, with
help from the principle of the excluded middle:' either the Saint caused
the ticket to win or she did not. Applying the principle of indifference not
to hide arbitrariness but by constitutional compulsion, we conclude that one
or the other or both of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses requires
that Greenfield calculate the posterior probability, and so the adequacy of
Pando's proof, starting from a prior probability of 0.5. The result, given the
evidence that a ticket purchased by Pando for Fernandez won, is a 0.999999
probability that the Saint caused the ticket to win. Obviously, this
probability greatly exceeds 0.5, the floor for proof by a preponderance of
the evidence.
IX. ENTANGLEMENT
Priors of an application of Bayes' theorem do not always appear
arbitrary, because often they are posteriors of an immediately preceding
application. Recall Hawking's turtle story.93 Although a prior stands on
another prior,94 it cannot be priors all the way down. One must eventually
just make up what becomes the bottom prior, usually by applying the
principle of indifference.
United States v. Hatahley95 decided that a court did not go down
enough turtles, did not proceed sufficiently far along the regress of priors,
and too hastily applied the principle of indifference. Significantly, the
context does not implicate the First Amendment. The United States, having
arrested on public land the horses and burros of the native-American
plaintiffs, sold these animals to a glue factory. The unlawfully precipitate
Postmodern legal analysis generally finds this principle suspect But the principle is not as
suspect as postmodem legal analysis. See Alan Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies,
LINGUA FRANCA 62 (May-June 1996).
" See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
9 FREDERICK SuPpE, THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF THEoRIEs AND SCIENTIFIC REALisM 399
(1989).
95 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958).
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sale indirectly diminished the flocks of sheep of the plaintiffs, herding them
having become more labor intensive; and the brutality to, and the loss of
companionship of, the sold animals saddened the plaintiffs.
Calculating damages, the district court twice applied the principle of
indifference. By its first application, it awarded the plaintiffs half the
decline in value of their individual flocks. The district court thus curtailed
the regress at the second stage, having at the first stage already counted
these individual flocks. It could have investigated the causes of the declines
in individual cases. That would have been the third stage. In its second
application, the district court stopped at the first stage, by dividing equally
among the plaintiffs an amount to compensate them for their bereavement,
rather than assessing particular levels of grief. The court of appeals re-
versed, requiring in each instance an additional step:
The [district] court found "that approximately fifty percent of this amount
represented damages to the plaintiffis] proximately caused by deprivation of the
use of plaintiffis'] horses .... The result, insofar as it related to use damage,
was arbitrary, pure speculation, and clearly erroneous.... There was consider-
able evidence that some of the plaintiffs mourned the loss of their animals for
a long period of time. We think it quite clear that the sum given each plaintiff
was wholly conjectural and picked out of thin air. The District Court seemed
to think that because the horses and burros played such an important part in the
Indians' lives, the grief and hardships were the same to each.'
Applied to Pando, across jurisdictions and jurisprudential subfields,
Hatahley might compel Judge Greenfield to articulate the probability that
the Saint intervened. He might, least intrusively, expand the set of possible
cases over which to distribute prior probabilities by the principle of indiffer-
ence. Despite difficulties in individualizing religions, he could begin this
effort with Hume's remark "that, in matters of religion, whatever is differ-
ent is contrary; and it is impossible that the religions of ancient Rome, of
Turkey, of Siam, and of China, should, all of them, be established on any
solid foundation,"9 so that "all the prodigies of different religions are to
be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether
weak or strong, as opposite to each other." 8 So Pando's prior falls from
0.5 to one divided by the number of religions.
One expects, without authority more specific than Lemon, that the third
entanglement part of its test precludes even this inquiry into priors. Hence
Greenfield, in Williams," forbade the jury, deciding whether the plaintiff
9'Id. at 925.
HuME, supra note 36, at 121.
Id. at 122.
Greenfield failed to cite to Lemon in Williams.
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had mitigated her damages despite refusing an operation that would reduce
them, to address the reasonableness of her beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness.
Also, as Calabresi recognizes, entanglement informs, however instinctively,
decisions like Friedman, in which the comparable issue is contributory
negligence.
The infusion of religion changes the rules of the game."®
X. ANOTHER WILLIAMS
Greenfield is not a bad man. I believe he was overcome by the
opportunity to decide Pando by the properties of miracles. As we see
below, however, the consequent injustice, if it was such, was ephemeral. No
harm came to Pando other than that inherent in being up against the law.
Greenfield's life on the trial bench would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and long without an occasional philosophical diversion. And his decision in
Williams v. Bright is redemptively sensitive. 1 '
Yet I sense that something more sinister is going on too. Recall that
Greenfield's decision to disregard the proof of St. Eleggua's miracle left
Pando and Fernandez with an effectively illegal contract. A comparable
disability followed from Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., ° a
celebrated decision by Judge Skelly Wright. In Walker-Thomas, recall, an-
other mother on welfare bought a stereo on time under a contract that upon
her default allowed the seller to repossess previous purchases paid off but
for a legal technicality. Although Wright remanded, the gist of his opinion
was that the contract was unconscionable. Well it was certainly harsh, but
the plaintiff had six children and Walker-Thomas would have been unlikely
without a large down payment to have released the stereo into that house-
hold with itself as its only security. A stereo in a household depreciates
proportionally to the number of children. Therefore, as in Pando, the result
was that Williams could not contract that way. In so far as her choice was
to contract thus or not at all, Wright was limiting her freedom to contract
by denying her the stereo. Well maybe she should have been feeding her
children. But Walker-Thomas, like Pando, imposes on the litigants values
or beliefs that judges, as a class, but not welfare mothers, likely hold.
XI. EPILOGUE
The issue of proving a miracle vanished from later proceedings in
,oo See supra Part VIII.
01 See supra Part IV.
02 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Pando. The appellate division agreed with Greenfield that "saintly interven-
tion is not provable in a court of law."' 3 The gist of this paper is, why in
heaven's name not? But the appellate division reversed Greenfield's award
of summary judgment to Fernandez, holding that it was an open issue of
fact whether the contract required this intervention or merely best efforts on
Pando's part to bring it about. Further litigation apparently resolved this
issue for Pando, because the case fades from the New York Supplement
seven years after it entered it, with Pando winning but unpaid. In 1989, the
appellate division affirmed an order that New York pay the next installment
of the prize into escrow. Fernandez, having received by then and dissipated
about half the $2.8 million prize, lacked funds to post a bond."° Walker-
Thomas would not have sold her a stereo either.
Although the appellate division decided Pando on other grounds, the
relevance to the modern world of its issue of proving miracles is manifest
in a recent article. 10 5 Marina Warner, a classicist and novelist, makes two
points connected to our inquiry. The first is that occurrences of miracles are
not merely historical:
As the millennium approaches, the frequency and the variety of such incidents
is increasing. The Virgin Mary has appeared in photographs of the sky and on
Eucharistic hosts. Her statues have wobbled in front of crowds thousands
strong; mystics have received the stigmata, and their own eyes have bled. The
phenomena have not quite kept pace with alien abductions and have not spread
worldwide as fast as the incidents of milk-drinking by the elephant-headed god
Ganesh - a prodigy that was seen within a matter of hours in both Calcutta and
Jersey City in September 1995. But, with advances in telecommunications, the
kind of Marian wonders that used to be dismissed as the fancies of a credulous
and benighted populace have begun to command interest far beyond the circle
of religious believers. Statues of the Virgin Mary also began drinking milk,
fist in Cheshire, then in Kuala Lumpur."
Warner's implicit second point is that a state asked to endorse or
denounce a miracle should, using the principle of indifference, apply a
neutral prior and let it go at that. Warner describes an Italian instance in
early 1995 of a statue of Mary weeping tears of blood that was challenged,
ultimately at law, by, among others, the otherwise devout telefono
antiplagio, controlo le truffe dei maghi e della sette, which title she renders
as "the anti-brainwashing telephone line, against the tricks of wizards and
sects."' A principle of Italian criminal law, absent except in special cases
103 Pando v. Daysi, 499 N.Y.S.2d 950, 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
,o Pando v. Daysi, 538 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
Marina Warer, Blood and Tears, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 1996, at 63.
'0 Id. at 64.
I ld. at 65.
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from our own individualistic jurisprudence, is l'obbligo dell'azione penale,
the duty to act. The result has been a surreal legal and ecclesiastic standoff
in which, disturbed that "blood is appearing on various statues all over
Italy, and more frequently,""'8 the secular authorities sequestered then
finally released the statue. During its captivity, they tested the Madonna
with a CAT scan, finding it solid; and they took a DNA profile of its tears,
which turned out to be hemoglobin, but, with uncertain implication, male.
Fabio Gregori, the owner of the statue and with his family the first witness
to its weeping, has been charged with abuso della creduliti populare, which
carries a fine but not imprisonment. Gregori refuses to let a DNA profile of
his blood be taken, except under ecclesiastical auspices.
The year 1995 was also a big one for Pando, not only because
Greenfield quoted his opinion in Williams, but also because of a fine stu-
dent Note in the Duke Law Journal, by Matthew J. Gries, which featured
Pando as representative of courts finding and enforcing contracts to divide
winnings from lotteries."'° Gries' reference is the second kick of the case.
The Note is interesting in several respects. Gries is less sanguine than I that
Pando honestly reported his understanding with Fernandez. Also, Gries
identifies the Saint Pando prayed to as "Eleggua, one of the 'seven African
powers' revered in some western hemisphere religions that have their
origins in Africa, such as voodoo."' .. The argument of the Note is inter-
esting and unexpected. Because they impair relationships, Gries would not
enforce agreements to divide winnings (unless these are written). Rather, he
would treat them as promises to make gifts routinely not enforced, or as
mere social promises. As an instance of the latter, he cites an action for
$49.53, settled out of court, by a girl against a boy for breaking a date to
take her to their high school prom."' One justification of Greenfield
granting summary judgment for Fernandez is that he thought as does Gries.
Nevertheless, I am uneasy characterizing by 'mere' an undertaking by
Pando and Fernandez, that the parties may have taken very seriously and
that anticipated a large if improbably realized return. The casual disregard
of their intentions harks back to the opinion of Skelly Wright in Walker-
Thomas.
Finally, Pando is important because in it three almost hopelessly
inexact inquiries-regarding prior probabilities, regarding religious truth,
and regarding the religion clauses of the First Amendment--converge to
produce a curiously certain rule. Prior probabilities notoriously lack suffi-
I' /d. at 68.
Matthew J. Gries, Note, Judicial Enforcement ofAgreements to Share Winning Lottery Tickets,
44 DuKE LJ. 1000 (1995).
"o Id. at 1004 n.9 (citing LUISA TEISH, JAMBALAYA 113 (1985)).
.. Id. at 1010.
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cient justification. We have no basis, other than the principle of indiffer-
ence, to assign one value rather than another. It is far enough down the
stack of turtles that we have no basis to assign any value, and it infects the
priors above it. I have quoted Justice Scalia claiming the cases explaining
the religion clauses are chaotic. And, independently of the current Italian
travail, courts are rightly reluctant to adjudicate religious truth. The issue is
how they may escape doing so. In Pando, helped by the third entanglement
part of the Lemon test, the principle of indifference finds a justification in
religious neutrality, and precisely measures the degree of credulity to be
accorded a religious claim under the Constitution.

